ROOSEVELT’S NEW "SUPER-COMMISSION." The big story this week-end (except in some of the isolationist papers) is President Roosevelt’s appointment of a four-member "superagency" to oversee the nation’s defense effort. It’s humble title is the Office for Production Management. It sounds like a promising attempt to speed up preparedness and eliminate the monkey wrenches which plague defense production. But the newspaper accounts provide as many questions as answers. The Board will have "full powers," according to George Bookman in the Washington Post -- but it "would not supercede the Army and Navy in the actual signing of contracts." Bruce Pinter in the New York Herald Tribune writes that the Board will be independent and its decisions will not be "subject to [Roosevelt’s] immediate approval." But "if any action was taken which he deemed contrary to the nation’s best interests he would call in the board and put them straight." Will the Board speed up production? Production has been speeding up every day, said the President elliptically.
As is his habit these days, the President claimed constitutional power to form the Board without the approval of Congress. He will form the agency through a series of executive orders, in a process expected to take about ten days. Interestingly, of the Board’s four members -- Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, automobile production wizard William S. Knudson, and union leader Sidney Hillman -- none is a Democrat. That’s a smart move politically, though it seems on the surface to increase the chances that the Board and the President might soon be publicly at odds.
STRAIGHT (AND SCARY) TALK IN TOKYO. If you’re looking for reassurance that the U.S. and Japan might smoothe over their frayed relations anytime soon, you won’t find it in Friday’s New York Times. Hugh Byas’ story on a blunt exchange of views between U.S. Ambassador Grew and Foreign Minister Matsuoka adds up to two things -- (1) the Roosevelt Administration is warning Japan unambiguously that America won’t cooperate with Japan’s plans for a "new order in Greater East Asia," and (2) according to Matsuoka, "Japan’s policy in the future will revolve around the three-power pact" with Germany and Italy.
The occasion was a mixed Japanese-American gathering in Tokyo honoring Japan’s new ambassador to Washington, Admiral Nomura. To Minister Matsuoka’s insistence that Japan’s aggression in China, and now in Indo-China, was a "moral crusade," Ambassador Grew retorted, "Let us say of nations as of men, by their fruits ye shall know them." On the other hand, Matsuoka warned that if the Administration brought the U.S. into the European war, the result would be "Armageddon and total destruction of our culture and civilization." This contrasts with the foreign minister’s tone a week ago, when he emphasized "safeguards" and "delays" in the wording of the three-power pact which would give the Japanese some leeway in its decision-making if the U.S. went to war with Germany.
The upshot of this seems to be that in recent months Japan has been telling America to stay out of Asia, and now they’re telling us to stay out of Europe as well. Fortunately, at least for the time being, they will allow to us remain involved in the affairs of North and South America.
THE ARGUMENT FOR NEGOTIATIONS. Just in time for Christmas, the Chicago Tribune’s editorial page insists once again that Europe’s warring powers should agree to a compromise peace treaty --
"In spite of sea and air attacks, the two belligerents are making no progress whatever toward a decision. If the war isn’t a stalemate, it at least is as far removed from anything promising success to either side. Apparently both can continue to withstand anything the other can throw at it for an indefinite period. There is great loss and suffering, but there is nothing promising a victory in any of the operations. British ingenuity is at work on methods to meet the attacks on its shipping. There has been success at that before and it may be expected that each new development in attack will be followed by a counteracting development in defense....Italy is suffering reverses. Before these reverses go too far the Nazis will probably give their fascist allies some effective aid....Germany’s inability to get at Great Britain for a fight to the finish is matched by Great Britain’s inability to get at Germany....People who reject all idea of a negotiated peace and talk of destroying the enemy must reject the facts. Unless something unforeseen or unforeseeable happens, the war remains one in which neither side can see an outcome favoring the continuance of unavailing but destructive efforts. Payment is deferred, but all this will be paid for. The longer it is deferred the more punishing the costs will be. Europe nearly cracked up in 1918."
A chilling possibility to contemplate, but once again the Tribune editors ignore the central question -- could Britain or the U.S. hope to live in peace with a Nazi Europe? Those who believe so "reject the facts" of what happened to Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, the low countries, France, and most recently Rumania. Aside from the moral question of turning our backs on the fate of these conquered peoples, it is folly to think that Hitler will miraculously begin living up to agreements with anyone. Every one of these tragic nations once received a hands-off guarantee from Germany. Could anyone really imagine the U.S. enjoying equitable trade relations with such a cynical, deceitful regime ascendant in Europe? Even if every one of the Tribune’s points were true -- pretty debatable in itself -- a negotiated peace could only be worse.
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