Tuesday, March 26, 1940

WILL THE NEAR EAST GO TO WAR? “It may only require an incident -- which spring or early summer may bring -- to involve the Near East more deeply in the European conflict.” So says an analysis prepared by Harvard’s Philip W. Ireland for the Foreign Policy Association, and reported Monday in the Washington Post. Mr. Ireland also points to the Balkans as a likely spot where a spark of conflict could bring that region wholly into the war. Soviet Russia, now freed from the Finnish campaign, can concentrate on her territorial goals in Rumania and Turkey, while the Germans and Russians plot to divide up influence in the region. Meanwhile, Hitler insists on his right to supply Germany’s warriors with Rumanian and Russian oil, while Britain promises “drastic measures” to shut off the oil flow.

But the Allied domination of the Near East gives Britain and France a valuable advantage in checking any move by Hitler and Stalin against a Balkan state or in the Near East itself. A report in the Chicago Sunday Tribune says that France has 200,000 troops in Syria and Lebanon alone. British and French forces in the region could be quickly called into action to stop aggression against Rumania or Turkey, both of which are protected by British guarantees. The Allies also could, if they wanted to get tough, launch a campaign to seize the Soviets’ Caucasus oilfields.

The Tribune story says that “the German-Russian bloc might turn its attention to the near east” itself, but that doesn’t seem too likely. “British and French friendship with Turkey...is being cemented more firmly...The sympathies of the neighboring Moslem states, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, are with Turkey, to whom they are linked by the Saadabad treaty of friendship. Since they support Turkey, they would no doubt support Britain and France, too.” That’s too many potential adversaries for the dictators, who don’t seem to like a fair fight.

FRANCE WANTS ACTION, BUT BRITAIN HESITATES. An analysis by James B. Reston in Sunday’s New York Times says that for some time the French have agitated for a more “daring” war strategy, while the British continue to be hesitant. According to Mr. Reston, France wanted early on in the Russo-Finnish war to send an Allied expeditionary force of 100,000 troops across Scandinavia to help Finland. They wanted to do so without the permission of Norway or Sweden, on the grounds that the Scandinavian countries' agreement to the League of Nations resolution supporting the Finns was tantamount to a grant of access. But Prime Minister Chamberlain took the more gingerly approach of asking the Norwegians and Swedes for permission to send troops through their territory, which they refused to give. The Times article says this presents a big problem in Allied cooperation --

“These facts of the Finnish case indicate the differences in method between the Allies. On the one hand, the French argue that this is a total war against a ruthless enemy who is breaking every rule of international law and who must receive a dose of his own medicine. On the other, the British argue that they must follow the letter of international law if they are not to be accused of trampling over rules that they are fighting to uphold. These two views, if not irreconcilable, are at least difficult to combine. The Allies tried to combine them into a compromise on the Finnish decision and it did not work, and the Allies have now reached a stage in the war where they are going to have to decide to go one way or the other.”

The British attitude could change, writes Mr. Reston -- “There are a considerable number of people in this country, led by Winston Churchill, who believe in the French theory and it may be that they will eventually gain the ascendancy.” But for now, alas, Chamberlain continues to be on top of the political situation. It can be said in his defense that caution is as important as courage in winning wars. But the important thing is knowing when to be cautious and when to be bold. The Prime Minister’s hesitancy is reflexive, and seems to be a hallmark of his every action.

“OOPS! WE OVERTHREW THE GOVERNMENT!” John Elliott offers an interesting profile of France’s new Premier Reynaud in Sunday’s New York Herald Tribune. He is a man, we are told, with great oratorical gifts and a champion of free economics, but the question yet to be answered is “can he handle men as expertly as he handles finances?” That aside, the most startling information in Mr. Elliott’s piece comes after the first sixteen paragraphs, where it’s explained that his ascendancy was merely some kind of dim-witted accident of French politics --

“The last thing that most of the deputies (who abstained from voting in the chamber in the small hours of Wednesday morning) desired was to throw Daladier out of office. They thought they were simply indulging in a harmless demonstration intended as a warning that the war must be conducted more vigorously in the future. They expected Daladier to form a war cabinet and remain as Premier. When the deputies learned that Daladier had interpreted their abstention as a vote of lack of confidence, most of them deeply regretted their action. They now feel remorse that Daladier was saddled unjustly with the responsibility for the collapse of Finland.”

Mr. Elliott also seconds the belief that Daladier will likely be back as Premier within a few weeks, if the Reynaud government fails to gain widespread support. That would certainly compound the mess. One wonders what ordinary people ruled by the dictators must think of such a circus. Yes, it’s great that French democracy continues to function during wartime, giving the lie to mounds of isolationist editorials on the subject. But to vote out the nation’s leader, then to come within a single vote of getting rid of his successor, and then to say you didn’t really mean any of it -- all in a single week -- only feeds the arguments of Nazi and Communist propaganda mills that democracy is a joke.